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CORPORATE GROUP CROSS-BORDER INSOLVENCIES
BETWEEN THE UNITED STATES & EUROPEAN UNION:
LEGAL & ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENTS
Nora Wouters∗
Alla Raykin∗∗
INTRODUCTION
As corporations become increasingly globalized, cross-border insolvencies
are more prevalent. Insolvency raises the problems of any cross-border dispute:
reciprocity, venue, choice of law, and cultural differences. However, unlike a
typical adversarial dispute, successful insolvency proceedings do not have a
single “winner,” and therefore raise unique problems. Insolvency’s goal of
maximum private and public economic benefit is best achieved through
cooperation, efficiency, and overall asset maximization.
Disparate parties each fighting for their best private outcome would
contravene a harmonious proceeding to achieve this goal. However, the
absence of a universal insolvency law makes achieving harmony through
cooperation across borders especially difficult. Each country has its own laws
and procedures, and each citizen creditor has expectations based on their
respective sovereign’s laws. Differences in these laws range from specific
(such as priorities and dischargeable claims) to the overarching goals (such as
creditor returns or job preservation).1
Navigating these competing laws is a significant problem for corporate
groups, or companies with many different entities comprising a larger entity.
Corporate groups often have branches or separate legal entities in different
countries and are therefore common in cross-border insolvencies. A successful
corporate group insolvency would accomplish several key goals: (1)
maximization of enterprise-wide value, (2) clarity and predictability in
∗
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applying the law, (3) treating similarly situated creditors equally, (4)
procedural fairness, (5) protection of employment, and (6) respecting the
separate legal status of entities.2
The ideal way to achieve these goals would be through a single, centralized
insolvency proceeding, but choosing the appropriate venue (COMI) for this is
problematic. This centralized proceeding would provide oversight to ensure
that these goals are pursued most effectively. A single proceeding would
minimize costs, expedite the proceedings, provide a single forum for
comparison of relevant options, discourage individual parties-in-interest from
taking action beneficial to them but suboptimal for the entire corporate group,
and ensure cooperation among all the parties. However, single proceedings
face three impediments to implementation: (1) adhering to creditors’ rights and
expectations under their country’s laws, so as to not discourage cross-border
lending; (2) inducing creditors of diverse and conflicting interests to cooperate
for collective asset maximization; and (3) respecting national sovereignty.
In the U.S., corporate groups can have a single consolidated proceeding,3
but there is no such mechanism for E.U. corporate groups. The European
Insolvency Regulation (“EIR”), which dictates how its signees treat intra-E.U.
insolvencies, does not explicitly address corporate groups. While a single,
efficient proceeding is possible under the EIR, it is not legally prescribed. The
difficulty of achieving a single efficient proceeding is exacerbated when a
cross-border E.U.-U.S firm must coordinate proceedings under the EIR and the
U.S. Bankruptcy Code (the “U.S. Code”). Unlike the U.S., the E.U. has no
continent-wide system of courts. Moreover, the EIR grants its member states
far more autonomy to apply local law than the U.S. Code grants its states.
Reorganizations of corporate groups, treated as a single entity, have a
greater chance at success than those treated as separate entities. A single
proceeding affords economic efficiencies, lower administrative costs, and
centralized control of restructuring. A standardized policy to guide crossborder group insolvencies would provide predictability to creditors, increase
the chances of successful restructuring, achieve maximization of the sale of
assets on an integrated level, and provide guidance to complete insolvencies.
Ultimately, such a policy would provide a workable solution to the inherent
tension between respecting the bounds of legally separate entities, while
2 Samuel L. Bufford, Coordination of Insolvency Cases for International Enterprise Groups: A
Proposal, 86 AM. BANKR. L.J. 685, 692 (2012).
3 See infra Part II.C.
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achieving asset maximization at the corporate group level. Leaving creditors
no worse off than in liquidation would be the guiding baseline for such a
solution.
In the absence of a single binding procedure, there are several means by
which private parties can ensure efficient proceedings. This Article addresses
the issues a practitioner will face in an E.U.-U.S. cross-border insolvency. Part
I discusses the current state of international insolvency law: the United Nations
Model Law, the European Union’s EIR, and the U.S.’s chapter 15. Part II
addresses corporate groups—what they are, their benefits, and the challenges
they face in insolvency. Determining a center of main interests (“COMI”) is
frequently the greatest challenge. Part III then discusses the costs of a
corporate group proceeding and how to maximize the proceedings’ efficiency.
This Part also highlights case examples of corporate groups that achieved
efficient proceedings and those that did not. Finally, Part IV provides
guidelines for private parties to use protocols to coordinate efficient
proceedings and how administrators can ensure efficiency.
I. EXISTENT CROSS-BORDER INSOLVENCY LAW
This Part will discuss the philosophical debate that has emerged around
cross-border insolvencies. There are two dominant philosophies to crossborder insolvency: universalism, which calls for a single proceeding and
harmonized insolvency law; and territoriality, which advocates separate
proceedings, with separate laws for each country in which the debtor has
assets. In practice, a hybrid “modified universalism” prevails. Part I.B.
explains how these philosophies have shaped the existent law. The United
Nations Commission on International Trade Law’s (“UNCITRAL”) Model
Law espouses modified universalism. Part I.C. describes the U.S.’s version of
the model law: chapter 15. While several European nations have also adopted
versions of the model law, insolvencies between E.U. member states is
governed by the European Insolvency Regulation (EIR), discussed in Part I.D.
A. Philosophical Underpinnings
The two diametrically opposed approaches to cross-border insolvencies are
universalism and territorialism.4 Most international insolvency law operates

4 E.g., Kent Anderson, The Cross-Border Insolvency Paradigm: A Defense of the Modified Universal
Approach Considering the Japanese Experience, 21 U. PA. J. INT’L ECON. L. 679, 687–94 (2000); Lucian Arye
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under the hybrid modified universalism, which aspires towards universalism,
but maintains elements of territorialism.
Universalism propounds a single unified law to govern bankruptcy
proceedings.5 This would be a regime similar to the U.S. Code—federal law
that controls in all U.S. states. Under universalism, all proceedings would take
place in a centralized court and proceedings would be subject to a single law
(with minor concessions to state law).6 Territorialism imposes no single law
but relies on each jurisdiction to apply its own laws. It subjects a multinational
debtor to parallel proceedings in each country in which its assets are located,
but each country’s court’s jurisdiction does not extend beyond the country’s
borders.7 Territorialism proponents argue that a formal universalist law
infringes upon national sovereignty, and private parties can enter into private
agreements, or protocols,8 to achieve efficiency without imposing a universal
law on sovereign states.9 Absent a universal policy, the chances of parallel
proceedings increase; multiple hearings add the costs of court-to-court
coordination and the risks of local jurisdictions creating self-protective law or
bias jurists.10 Intuitively, fewer competing proceedings are more efficient.
Nonetheless, universalism’s ideal of a single proceeding is difficult to
implement: countries and their citizen creditors are hesitant to cede their
sovereignty.
Bebchuck & Andrew T. Guzman, An Economic Analysis of Transnational Bankruptcies, 42 J.L. & ECON. 775
(1999); Robert K. Rasmussen, A New Approach to Transnational Insolvencies, 19 MICH. J. INT’L L. 1 (1997);
Donald T. Trautman et al., Four Models for International Bankruptcy, 41 AM. J. COMP. L. 573 (1993); Philipp
Wagner, Insolvency and Arbitration: A Pleading for International Insolvency Law, 5 DISP. RESOL. INT’L 189
(2011); Liza Perkins, Note, A Defense of Pure Universalism in Cross-Border Corporate Insolvencies, 32
N.Y.U. J. INT’L L. & POL. 787 (2000).
5 Andrew T. Guzman, International Bankruptcy: In Defense of Universalism, 98 MICH. L. REV. 2177,
2179; (2000); Jay Lawrence Westbrook, A Global Solution to Multinational Default, 98 MICH. L. REV. 2276,
2292–98 (2000).
6 For example, state laws have a greater impact on how personal insolvencies are resolved (homestead
exemptions and mortgage laws). Contract and tort law will vary by U.S. state and affect chapter 11
proceedings.
7 See Samuel L. Bufford, Global Venue Controls Are Coming: A Reply to Professor LoPucki, 79 AM.
BANKR. L.J. 105, 108 (2005).
8 See infra Part IV.B. (discussing the benefits of protocols, how they are used, and guidelines for
developing protocols).
9 Lynn M. LoPucki, Cooperation in International Bankruptcy: A Post-Universalist Approach, 84
CORNELL L. REV. 696, 2219 (1999); see also John J. Chung, The New Chapter 15 of the Bankruptcy Code: A
Step toward Erosion of National Sovereignty, 27 NW. J. INT’L L. & BUS. 89 (2006); Edward J. Janger, Virtual
Territoriality, 48 COLUM. J. TRANSNAT’L L. 401, 407 (2010) (citing Federal Mogul as an example of a case
where territorial rules—the priority in of creditors—were ignored).
10 Evelyn H. Biery et al., A Look at Transnational Insolvencies and Chapter 15 of the Bankruptcy Abuse
Prevention and Consumer Protection Act of 2005, 47 B.C. L. REV. 23, 31–32 (2005).
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The existent practice of cross-border insolvency is neither of these
absolutes, but is a “modified universalism.”11 Modified universalism embraces
the economic efficiency of single proceedings without a single universal
bankruptcy law.12 It strikes a compromise between the two by allowing
secondary proceedings13 and emphasizes cross-border cooperation, with
cooperating countries maintaining their own laws.14
B. The Model Law
UNCITRAL’s Model Law on Insolvency15 has influenced cross-border
cooperation and created a uniform adoption of modified universalism.16 Under
the Model Law, adopting countries decide their own substantive law, but must
allow foreign representatives “equal, simple, and fast access” to their law.17
The Model Law provides a tool for “authorizing and encouraging cooperation
and coordination between jurisdictions.”18 Its four key elements are access,
recognition, relief (assistance), and cooperation.19

11 Leif M. Clark & Karen Goldstein, Sacred Cows: How to Care for Secured Creditors’ Rights in CrossBorder Bankruptcies, 46 TEX. INT’L L.J. 513, 518–22 (2011). See generally Westbrook, supra note 5
(describing modified universalism as a solution and critiquing other alternatives).
12 Jamie Altman, A Test Case in International Bankruptcy Protocols: The Lehman Brothers Insolvency,
in 2011 NORTON ANN. REV. INTL. INSOLVENCY 11.
13 See infra text accompanying notes 47–52 (explaining secondary proceedings).
14 Altman, supra note 12.
15 U.N. Comm’n on Int’l Trade Law, Model Law on Cross-Border Insolvency with Guide to Enactment,
U.N. Sales No. E.99.V.3 (1997).
16 Matthew T. Cronin, Comment, UNCITRAL Model Law on Cross-Border Insolvency: Procedural
Approach to a Substantive Problem, 24 J. CORP. L. 709, 710 (1999). The Model Law on Cross-Border
Insolvency was adopted by the U.N. in 1997. Legislation based on the Model Law has been adopted twenty
countries to date—Eritrea (1998), Mexico (2000), South Africa (2000), Japan (2000), Montenegro (2002),
Romania (2003), Poland (2003), Serbia (2004), the British Virgin Islands (2005), Ireland (2005), the United
States of America (2005), Great Britain (2006), New Zealand (2006), and Colombia (2006), Republic of Korea
(2006), Australia (2008), Mauritius (2009), Greece (2010), Uganda (2011). Status, 1997—UNCITRAL Model
Law on Cross-Border Insolvency, U.N. COMM’N ON INT’L TRADE LAW, http://www.uncitral.org/uncitral/en/
uncitral_texts/insolvency/1997Model_status.html (last visited May 20, 2013).
17 Jenny Clift, The UNCITRAL Model Law on Cross-Border Insolvency—A Legislative Framework to
Facilitate Coordination and Cooperation in Cross-Border Insolvency, 12 TUL. J. INT’L & COMP. L. 307 (2004).
18 U.N. Comm’n on Int’l Trade Law, Model Law on Cross-Border Insolvency: The Judicial Perspective
(Feb. 2012), http://www.uncitral.org/pdf/english/texts/insolven/V1188129-Judicial_Perspective_ebook-E.pdf.
19 Id. For more resources on the Model Law, see Clift, supra note 17; Allan L. Gropper, The Model Law
After Five Years: The U.S. Experience with COMI, in 2011 NORTON ANN. REV. INTL. INSOLVENCY 13;
Anthony Sexton, Current Problems and Trends in the Administration of Transnational Insolvencies Involving
Enterprise Groups: The Mixed Record of Protocols, The UNCITRAL Model Insolvency Law, and the EU
Insolvency Regulation, 12 CHI. J. INT’L 811 (2012).
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Comity is integral to the Model Law.20 Under the Model Law, the principle
of comity has evolved into “recognition.”21 Once a court recognizes a foreign
main proceeding, the recognizing court should use its equitable discretion to
fashion post-recognition relief, equivalent to what that foreign court would
anticipate under its own laws.22 According to one study, out of 195 cases,
recognition was granted in 95% of all cases under the Model Law.23
C. U.S. Law: Chapter 1524
In 2005, the U.S. adopted the Model Law in chapter 15. Its encourages
cooperation for transnational cases and provides for fair and efficient
administration of cases.25 Like the Model Law, it prescribes recognition of
foreign proceedings but limits recognition if actions would violate the
recognizing country’s public policy.
Chapter 15 was an extension of former 11 U.S.C. § 304,26 which permitted
foreign representatives to appear in U.S. court without submitting to that
court’s jurisdiction.27 U.S. courts have recognized that absent recognition of
foreign proceedings, equitable and orderly distribution of assets would not be
possible.28 One court explained chapter 15’s emphasis on cooperation:
United States courts, trustees, examiners, debtors and debtors in
possession and the courts and other competent authorities of foreign
countries; greater legal certainty for trade and investment; fair and
efficient administration of cross-border insolvencies that protects the
20 Comity is the mutual recognition of acts of other political entities. It “is neither a matter of absolute
obligation, on the one hand, nor of mere courtesy and good will, upon the other. But it is the recognition which
one nation allows within its territory to the legislative, executive, or judicial acts of another nation, having due
regard both to international duty and convenience, and to the rights of its own citizens, or of other persons who
are under the protection of its laws.” BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY (2009) (quoting Hilton v. Guyot, 159 U.S.
113, 163–64 (1895) (internal quotation marks omitted)).
21 See In re Bear Stearns High-Grade Structured Credit Strategies Master Fund, Ltd., 374 B.R. 122, 126–
32 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y 2007), aff’d 389 B.R. 325 (S.D.N.Y 2008).
22 See In re Atlas Shipping A/S, 404 B.R. 726, 738–46 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. 2009).
23 Irit Mevorach, On the Road to Universalism: A Comparative and Empirical Study of the UNCITRAL
Model Law on Cross-Border Insolvency, 12 EUR. BUS. ORG. L. REV. 520, 533 (2011) (noting that of the 195
cases, only in 9 did the court not approve recognition).
24 11 U.S.C §§ 1501–1532 (2006).
25 H.R. REP. NO. 109-31 at 105 (2005), reprinted in 2005 U.S.C.C.A.N. 88, 169; see also In re Basis
Yield Alpha Fund (Master), 381 B.R. 37, 44 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. 2008).
26 11 U.S.C. § 304 (2002) (repealed 2005).
27 See Biery, supra note 10, at 31–32 (discussing the evolution of precedent under § 304 and the
ramifications of chapter 15). Courts have relied on pre-chapter 15 precedents to adjudge cases, particularly
when it comes to recognition and comity.
28 Vitrix S.S. Co., S.A. v. Salen Dry Cargo A.B., 825 F.2d 709, 713–14 (2d Cir. 1987).
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interests of all creditors and other interested entities, including the
debtor; the protection and maximization of the debtor’s assets; and
29
the facilitation of the rescue of financially troubled businesses.

A foreign court or representative recognized by a U.S. court may also inure the
benefits of other U.S. Code provisions.30 A representative may also ask the
court for relief beyond what is already provided in the Code.31
Comity has a rarely invoked exception32 to ensure it “does not prejudice the
rights of United States citizens or violate domestic public policy.”33 Chapter
15, as well as other Model Law adoptions, except otherwise mandatory
recognition for actions “manifestly contrary to the public policy of the United
States.”34
In the U.S., all bankruptcy courts operate under chapter 15 for dealing with
foreign debtors and proceedings. Within the E.U., the EIR guides the
interactions of insolvencies between the E.U. member states.
D. The European Insolvency Regulation (EIR)35
While the EIR favors a universalist approach, it allows for the opening of
secondary proceeding in addition to the main proceeding. This Subpart
describes provisions of the EIR which protect creditors’ property rights and
expectations, and why secondary proceedings are sometimes necessary to
protect those rights. It then discusses proposed reforms to the EIR.
The EIR came into effect in 2002.36 Its goals were to enable cross-border
proceeding to operate efficiently, provide measures for coordinating the
29

In re Basis Yield Alpha, 381 B.R. at 44.
11 U.S.C. § 1520 (2006) (incorporating 11 U.S.C. §§ 361, 362, 363, 549, 552).
31 United States v. J.A. Jones Const. Grp., LLC, 333 B.R. 637, 638 (E.D.N.Y. 2005) (quoting 11 U.S.C.
§ 1521); In re AJW Offshore, Ltd., Nos. 13-70078-ast, 13-70082-ast, 13-70085-ast, 13-70087-ast, 2013 WL
1147203 (Bankr. E.D.N.Y Mar. 19, 2013) (explaining that a foreign representative in the Cayman Islands
could get the turnover of debtor records, as long as adverse parties had an opportunity for hearing).
32 Megan R. O’Flynn, Comment, The Scorecard So Far: Emerging Issues in Cross-Border Insolvencies
Under Chapter 15 of the U.S. Bankruptcy Code, 32 NW. J. INT’L L. & BUS. 391, 413 (2012) (citing two rare
examples: In re Toft, 453 B.R. 186 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. 2011); In re Gold & Honey, Ltd., 410 B.R. 357 (Bankr.
E.D.N.Y. 2009)).
33 Vitrix S.S., 825 F.2d at 713 (citing Hilton v. Guyot, 159 U.S. 113, 164 (1895)).
34 11 U.S.C. § 1504 (2006). In the EIR, the public policy exception is Article 26. Council Regulation
1346/2000 of 29 May 2000 on Insolvency Proceedings 2000 O.J. (L 160) 1 (EC), at art. 26 [hereinafter EIR].
35 EIR, supra note 34.
36 See generally BOB WESSELS, EUROPEAN UNION REGULATION OF INSOLVENCY PROCEEDINGS: AN
INTRODUCTORY ANALYSIS (3d ed. 2003).
30
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handling of debtors’ assets, and to avoid forum shopping.37 It applies only
when the debtor has operations in two or more E.U. member States, but does
not apply to non-E.U. countries.38
Once the main proceeding is opened in the debtor’s “home country,” all
other countries where the debtor has assets are subject to the laws of the main
proceeding country.39 Other E.U. countries must recognize the main
proceedings, and the main proceeding’s local laws dictate the liquidator’s
powers.40 Article 16(1) mandates recognition of other E.U. member states.41
Important to the integrity of a universalist regime is a respect for local
property rights. Article 5 guarantees creditors that their rights in rem will not
be vitiated by another country’s laws;42 it is an exception to the general rule
that the main proceeding’s country’s laws operate.43 Any creditor has the legal
right to open “secondary proceedings” in the country of the assets to pursue its
rights in rem.44 Balancing property rights and efficiency drive varying
interpretations of when creditors should be allowed to open secondary
proceedings.45 Limiting secondary proceedings to only when a creditor’s rights
would be diminished without them would be most efficient. This interpretation
ensures creditors do not receive unfair discriminatory treatment.46

37 Bob Wessels, EU Insolvency and Its Impact on European Business, CESIFO DICE REPORT, Jan. 2006,
at 16, 17, available at http://www.cesifo-group.de/portal/pls/portal/docs/1/1193244.pdf.
38 Id.
39 Samuel L. Bufford, International Insolvency Case Venue in the European Union: The Parmalat and
Daisytek Controversies, 12 COLUM. J. EUR. L. 429, 434 (2006).
40 Id.
41 EIR, supra note 34, at art. 16(1) (“Any judgment opening insolvency proceedings handed down by a
court of a Member State which has jurisdiction pursuant to Article 3 shall be recognised in all the other
Member States from the time that it becomes effective in the State of the opening of proceedings.”).
42 Id. at art. 5.
43 INSOL EUROPE, REVISION OF THE EUROPEAN INSOLVENCY REGULATION: PROPOSALS 51 (May 2012).
44 The four possible interpretations for opening secondary proceedings are:

(1) the national law where the assets are physically located (“lex rei sitae”) set a floor for the
rights, but the rights shall also not be greater than in the lex rei sitae; (2) the rights via the lex rei
sitae will be unaffected by the main proceedings; (3) the rights are only limited by the lesser of
the two limitations (and may profit from the difference); or (4) a “hard and fast rule,” which
allows opening proceedings for any alleged vitiation of rights.
Id. at 51–52.
45 Id. at 53.
46 Unfair and discriminatory treatment is a driving principle in confirmation of chapter 11 plans. See 11
U.S.C. § 1129(b)(2)(B)(iv) (2006).
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Article 27 governs secondary proceedings,47 sometimes known as ancillary
proceedings.48 The EIR mandates that the liquidators of secondary proceedings
cooperate closely with other liquidators.49 Despite this mandate, the main
liquidator may not learn of the initiation of a secondary proceeding early
enough to request a stay for a proceeding that may interfere with the most
efficient resolution to the insolvency.50 The EIR limits secondary proceedings
to winding up proceedings, thereby favoring liquidation over group
reorganization.51 As an alternative to secondary proceedings, some
commentators have suggested the main proceedings execute “synthetic
proceedings,” in which the main court would operate under the law of a
foreign member state to replicate the outcome of a secondary proceeding,
without opening another proceeding in another court.52
Recently, one court issued a formalistic reading of the EIR.53 The court
read the EIR’s purpose as coordinating efficient proceedings.54 This reading
suggests that secondary proceedings are the only proceedings other than the
main proceedings that may be opened.55 The decision explained that when
secondary proceedings are opened, the main proceedings must serve to protect
debtor’s entire asset pool.56
1. E.U. Recommended Reforms
In 2011, the European Parliament called for a revision of the EIR.57 In
2012, a Working Group made recommendations to improve the law by
including a chapter devoted to corporate groups. These recommendations
included requiring the court to hear the administrator of the main proceedings

47

EIR, supra note 34, at art. 27.
See Jose M. Garrido, No Two Snowflakes the Same: The Distributional Question in International
Bankruptcies, 46 TEX. INT’L L.J. 459, 473 (2011).
49 Michel Menjucq & Reinhard Dammann, Regulation No 1346/2000 on Insolvency Proceedings: Facing
the Companies Group Phenomenon, 9 BUS. L. INT’L 145, 148 (2008).
50 EIR, supra note 34, at art. 33.
51 Id. at art. 27.
52 See, e.g., John A. E. Pottow, A New Role for Secondary Proceedings in International Bankruptcies, 20
J. BANKR. L. & PRAC. 5, Art. 1 (2011).
53 Bank Handlowy v. Warszawie SA C-116/11 [Judgment of the Court of the (First Chamber)] Nov. 22,
2012 (Pol.).
54 Id.
55 Id.
56 Id.
57 See Harmonisation of Insolvency Law at EU Level, EUR. PARL. DOC. PE 419.633 (2010).
48
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prior to opening any secondary proceedings. This would enable a court to
postpone (or eliminate altogether) the need for secondary proceedings.
Prior to the issuance of the Working Group’s recommendations, the E.U.
commissioned a study to elicit responses from insolvency participants in E.U.
member states.58 Respondents reported that despite guidance encouraging
cooperation, there was a lack of cooperation and communication between
courts.59 Given the amount of money and information that moves across
borders, it is essential to coordinate the sharing of information and
cooperation.60 A specific EIR provision to govern coordination for corporate
groups, including those groups that have non-E.U. entities, would mitigate
these concerns.
II. CORPORATE GROUPS
A corporate group is a number of companies consisting of parent and
subsidiary companies.61 However, neither the EIR nor chapter 15 define a
corporate group or stipulate an insolvency process for a corporate group’s
multiple entities.62 While the U.S. Code permits group reorganizations through
a single insolvency venue,63 the EIR’s strong theory of separateness prevents it
from being as effective in consolidating group proceedings.64
This Part addresses why corporate groups are so prevalent and the unique
problems they pose in insolvency. One of the key benefits of groups—
flexibility, also makes standardized rules for groups difficult to define with

58 Commission Staff Working Document Executive Summary of the Impact Assessment accompanying the
document Revision of Regulation (EC) No 1346/2000 on Insolvency Proceedings, COM (2012) 742 final (Dec.
12, 2012) [hereinafter EC Impact Assessment].
59 Id.
60 Leah Barteld, Cross-Border Bankruptcy and the Cooperative Solution, 9 B.Y.U. INT’L L. & MGMT.
REV. 27, 43 (2012) (quoting Quentin Peel, Keynote at International Bar Association 2009 Annual Conference
(Oct. 4, 2009)).
61 INSOL EUROPE, supra note 43, at 30 (EIR Proposed Article 2(j): “a number of companies consisting of
parent and subsidiary companies”). But see Irit Mevorach, INSOL Europe’s Proposals on Groups of
Companies (in Cross-Border Insolvency): A Critical Appraisal, 21 INT’L INSOLVENCY REV. 183, 188–89
(2012).
62 Gabriel Moss, Proposal for Group COMI and its Consequences at the Tenth Annual International
Insolvency Conference (June 7–8, 2010) (available at http://www.iiiglobal.org/component/jdownloads/finish/
39/3890.html).
63 28 U.S.C. § 1408(2) (2006).
64 See Mevorach, supra note 61, at 194 & n.41.
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universal agreement.65 Part II.B. addresses the foremost problem for any
corporate group insolvency: determining its COMI. The E.U. has a place of
registration rebuttable presumption and the U.S. had a main office test. Any
approach should provide predictability to creditors, and clarify COMI early in
the proceedings. Part II.C. explains how, once a COMI is established,
proceedings could be made more efficient through consolidation. There are
two forms of consolidation: procedural consolidation resolves the issues of all
the group’s entities in one proceeding; substantive consolidation shatters the
legal barriers between the entities and treats them as one. Procedural
consolidation is more commonly employed, while substantive consolidation is
rarer and more maligned.
A. The Benefits of Corporate Groups
The term “enterprise group” covers an array of economic organizations
with two or more distinct legal entities linked through either an indirect or
direct form of control or ownership.66 This Subpart discusses the different
forms corporate groups take and how legal systems treat these forms.
Structural flexibility benefits the corporate group by allowing for the allocation
of risk and reduction of the cost of capital through the leverage effect. All sorts
of group structures can benefit from a centralized, more efficient insolvency
proceeding.67 However, centralized proceedings conflict with most legal
systems’ emphasis on respecting the separateness of legal entities. While some
non-legal mechanisms, such as contractualism,68 may lead to efficient
outcomes, the status quo of corporate group insolvencies is done on a case-bycase basis,69 providing little confidence in an efficient result.
Corporate group’s structural dynamism makes it difficult to pre-determine
third-party expectations about the corporate group’s structure. Corporate
65 UNCITRAL explains that the term “enterprise group” covers various forms of economic organizations
that are treated as a single entity but composed of two or more legal entities linked together by direct or
indirect ownership. U.N. Comm’n on Int’l Trade Law, Model Law on Cross-Border Insolvency: Legislative
Guide on Insolvency Law, U.N. Sales No. E.12.V.16, at 85–86 (July 2012), available at http://www.uncitral.
org/pdf/english/texts/insolven/Leg-Guide-Insol-Part3-ebook-E.pdf [hereinafter Legislative Guide]; see also
Bufford, supra note 2, at 688 n.16 (providing several different definitions).
66 Legislative Guide, supra note 65, at 5.
67 Centralization is not always sought, even if it may be beneficial. Mevorach, supra note 23, at 542.
Even with a universalist approach, there may sometimes still be subsequent appeals and litigation. Id. at 547.
68 See e.g., Robert K. Rasmussen, Resolving Transnational Insolvencies Through Private Ordering, 98
MICH. L. REV. 2252 (2000).
69 Several European jurisdictions, such as the UK, Germany, France, Italy, and Hungary have found
partial case-law solutions to group insolvencies. Moss, supra note 62.
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groups may be decentralized or centralized. Subsidiaries in foreign countries
may operate independently of its parent and have little connection to it aside
from legal arrangements.70 A subsidiary may appear to the public as an
independent company, and the size and complexity of the group is
unapparent.71 Contrarily, the public image of the corporate group may be that
of a unitary organization operating under a single corporate identity, despite
having separate legal entities in each country.72 An entity in the group may
enter into contracts independently, on behalf of another, or through
intercompany and transfer pricing agreements.73
There are many economic and legal benefits to allowing the corporate
group to structure in a way that makes most sense for it.74 Most legal systems
emphasize respect for corporate entity separateness. While some countries,
such as Germany, have adopted specific legal regimes for corporate groups,
attempts to do so at the E.U. level have failed.75 The law is reluctant to ignore
its reverence for legal separateness; however, balancing this reverence with the
goals of insolvency creates difficulties.76
Risk allocation and the structural flexibility can mitigate the likelihood of
corporate group insolvency. Individual subsidiaries of a group usually will not
file for bankruptcy unless the parent’s health requires it.77 Aggregation of
companies into a large unit creates a “leverage effect,” which reduces the cost
of capital, because companies supported and backed by others are less likely to
file bankruptcy.78 Independent subsidiaries allow for an apportioning of risk
where each legal entity has an easily ascertainable level of risk, independent
from another one, which may be more attractive to different creditors.79
70 See Henry Hansmann & Reinier Kraakman, The Essential Role of Organizational Law, 110 YALE L.J.
387, 437 (2000).
71 IRIT MEVORACH, INSOLVENCY WITHIN MULTINATIONAL ENTERPRISE GROUPS 154–55 (2009).
72 Id.
73 Id.
74 See Hansmann & Kraakman, supra note 70, at 437.
75 MEVORACH, supra note 71, at 52–56.
76 Robert K. Rasmussen, Where Are All the Transnational Bankruptcies? The Puzzling Case for
Universalism, 32 BROOK. J. INT’L L. 983, 994 (2007). (citing John Armour & Simon Deakin, Norms in Private
Insolvency: The “London Approach” to the Resolution of Financial Distress, 1 J. CORP. L. STUD. 21 (2001)).
77 Thomas C. Baxter, Jr. & Joseph H. Sommer, Breaking Up is Hard to Do: An Essay on Cross-Border
Challenges in Resolving Financial Groups, in SYSTEMIC FINANCIAL CRISES: RESOLVING LARGE BANK
INSOLVENCIES (Douglas D. Evanoff & George G. Kaufman, eds. 2005).
78 Nico Dewaelheyns & Cynthia Van Hulle, Corporate Failure Prediction Modeling, 33 J. BUS. & ACC.
909, 912-915 (June–July 2006) (discussing liquidity, size, and efficiency as influential factors).
79 Alexander Dåhnert, The Threat of Corporate Groups and the Insolvency Connection, 18 INSOL INT’L
INSOLVENCY REV. 209 (2009) (discussing the reasoning behind groups and strategies considered); Nico
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However, systemic failure can lead to corporate group failure.80 In Europe,
the vast majority of cases filed under the EIR are corporate groups.81 In the
U.S., the majority of chapter 15 cases also involved corporate groups.82 Three
key features that distinguish the corporate group insolvency from a standard
individual insolvency are: (1) each entity in the group has its own legal status,
shareholders, creditors, and assets; (2) each entity may have a unique COMI;
and (3) coordination between the entities is difficult.83
All types of groups may benefit from centralized proceedings.84 Often,
“cooperation may be the only way to reduce the risk of piecemeal insolvency
proceedings that have the potential to destroy going concern value and lead to
asset ring-fencing, as well as asset shifting or forum shopping by debtors.”85 If
there are multiple proceedings for legally distinct entities, the debtors may
have to rely on the corporate group identity to get recognition for another
proceeding.86 Being able to reorganize as a full entity, rather than piecemeal,
can also permit the group to continue as a going concern and inure the benefits
of the leverage effect.
Flexibility in the corporate structure has important ex ante benefits, but can
continue to have benefits as to how the enterprise restructures ex post through
private ordering. One example of private ordering is the “London Approach”
(or ad hoc contractualism).87 This entails getting standstill agreements preinsolvency from creditors to guarantee no secondary proceedings.88 Though
Dewaelheyns & Cynthia Van Hulle, Internal Capital Markets and Capital Structure: Bank Versus Internal
Debt (2007), available at http://www.econ.kuleuven.be/eng/tew/academic/afi/pdfs/afi_0703.pdf.
80 Cf. Alexandra CC Ragan, Comment, Comi Strikes A Discordant Note: Why U.S. Courts Are Not in
Complete Harmony Despite Chapter 15 Directives, 27 EMORY BANKR. DEV. J. 117, 168 (2010).
81 Irit Merovach, The Road to a Suitable and Comprehensive Global Approach to Insolvencies Within
Multinational Corporate Groups, 15 J. BANKR. L. & PRAC. 5 ART. 1 (2006).
82 A 2010 study found of 383 cases filed, 232 involved enterprise groups. Jay Lawrence Westbrook, The
Model Law and the United States: COMI and Groups at the Tenth Annual International Insolvency Conference
(June 7–8, 2010) (available at http://www.iiiglobal.org/component/jdownloads/finish/362/4114.html).
83 Bufford, supra note 2, at 690.
84 Eberhard Neitzer, Guidelines for Coordination of Multinational Enterprise Group Insolvencies, 4
INT’L INSOLVENCY L. REV. 491, 499 (2012)
85 Legislative Guide, supra note 65, at 41–42.
86 Id. at 42.
87 Rasmussen, supra note 76, at 997 (citing Armour & Deakin, supra note 76). Several sources urge
private cooperation outside of court. E.g., TRANSNATIONAL INSOLVENCY: COOPERATION AMONG THE NAFTA
COUNTRIES (A.L.I. 2003); Bob Wessels & Miguel Virgós, European Communication and Cooperation
Guidelines for Cross-border Insolvency (July 2007), available at http://www.insol.org/INSOLfaculty/pdfs/
BasicReading/Session%205/European%20Communication%20and%20Cooperation%20Guidelines%20for%2
0Cross-border%20Insolvency%20.pdf.
88 Rasmussen, supra note 76, at 997.
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private ordering has its benefits, the London Approach presumes that
management will foresee financial difficulties early enough to seek the
agreements and secure the cooperation of the creditors.
While many group insolvencies have had positive outcomes, limited
predictability has resulted in a case-by-case approach that is “haphazard.”89
Opening of separate proceedings with independent administrators leads to the
disintegration of the business and ultimately a decrease in the returns to the
creditors.90 Determining an appropriate home for group main proceedings is
essential to preventing disintegrated main proceedings.
B. Center of Main Interests (COMI)
Where is the “right” place to complete the group insolvency proceedings?91
The E.U. and the U.S. have different approaches to COMI. In most instances
the outcome will be the same, but there can be some variance. Both approaches
are concerned with predictability to creditors, but the E.U. focuses on formal
registration, whereas the U.S. focuses on the head office test. There is no
concept such as a corporate group COMI; each legal entity may have its own
COMI.92 It is probably too difficult to set up an unflagging rule for
determining COMI.93 Flexibility granted to corporation groups also requires
courts be reciprocally flexible for proceedings.94 Nonetheless, predictability is
a key tenet for effective insolvency policy.
A COMI is integral to a single (universalist) proceeding.95 It is the venue
for proceeding, and triggers the venue’s applicable law for the proceedings. A
COMI is perpetual for the insolvency and at any given time, a company can
89 Irit Mevorach, Towards A Consensus on the Treatment of Multinational Enterprise Groups in
Insolvency, 18 CARDOZO J. INT’L & COMP. L. 359, 366 (2010) (explaining a lack of explicit rules leads to the
haphazard approach).
90 See Ian Fletcher, The European Union Regulation on Insolvency Proceedings, in INSOL
INTERNATIONAL, CROSS-BORDER INSOLVENCY: A GUIDE TO RECOGNITION AND ENFORCEMENT 15, 20 (2003).
91 See, e.g., Mevorach, supra note 89, at 388–98; Irit Mevorach, The “Home Country” of a Multinational
Enterprise Group Facing Insolvency, in 2009 NORTON ANN. REV. INTL. INSOLVENCY 5; Jay Lawrence
Westbrook, Locating the Eye of the Financial Storm, 32 BROOK. J. INT’L L. 1019 (2007).
92 Janis Sarra, Oversight and Financing of Cross-Border Business Enterprise Group Insolvency
Proceedings, 44 TEX. INT’L L.J. 547, 562 (2009).
93 See U.N. Comm’n on Int’l Trade Law, Working Group V (Insolvency Law), Treatment of Corporate
Groups in Insolvency, ¶¶ 39–47, U.N. Doc. A/CN.9/WG.V/WP.74 (Oct. 4, 2006).
94 U.N. Comm’n on Int’l Trade Law, Working Group V (Insolvency Law), Report of Working Group V
(Insolvency Law) on the Work of Its Thirty-Fifth Session, ¶¶ 28–29 U.N. Doc. A/CN.9/666 (Dec. 2, 2008).
95 Mevorach, supra note 89, at, 397 (citing the EIR, the UNCITRAL Model Law, and the ALI
Principles).
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only have one COMI.96 Corporate groups may not have an easily ascertainable
home or may have many homes each with an equal proportion of the group’s
operations.97 The E.U.’s research has shown that COMI issues arose in 40–
50% of all insolvency cases, though COMI was not always contested.98
In the most efficient procedure, the beginning of a case should look to
determine an enterprise-wide COMI. There need not be a rigid COMI rule, but
a set of criteria to determine COMI is in the right forum early in the
proceedings. Then, creditors can level their expectations and be aware that
secondary proceedings are not permissible unless there is a credible threat that
their Article 5 rights would not be protected.
1. E.U. Approach
EIR Article 3 dictates that the COMI is the place of registration, but this is
a rebuttable presumption.99 The 2006 Eurofood decision explained that this
presumption is very strong, rebuttable only by a clear set of factors that
cumulatively indicate to third parties a different COMI.100 Eurofood reduced
the scope for procedural consolidation of separate legal entities.101 Some

96

Adam Gallagher, Center of Main Interest: The EU Insolvency Regulation and Chapter 15, AM.
BANKR. INST. J., July–Aug. 2009, at 44, 79.
97 LoPucki, supra note 9, at 713–18 (1999).
98 EC Impact Assessment, supra note 58, at 5. INSOL recommends the following definition for COMI:
the place of the registered office, except that, (i) where the operational head office functions of
the company or legal person are carried out in another Member State and that other Member
State is ascertainable to actual and prospective creditors as the place where such operational head
office functions are carried out, it shall mean and refer to the Member State where such
operational head functions are carried out and (ii) where the company or legal person is a mere
holding company or mere holding legal person, within a group with head office functions in
another Member State, the centre of main interests as defined in the previous sentence is located
in such other Member State. The mere fact that the economic choices and decisions of a company
are or can be controlled by a parent company in another Member State than the Member State of
the registered office does not cause the centre of main interests to be located in this other
Member State. In the case of individuals, the centre of main interests shall mean the place of
habitual residence, except that in case of professionals it shall be the professional’s principal
office or principal location from which his profession is conducted.
INSOL EUROPE, supra note 61, at 9.
99 “For a company or legal person, the place of its registered office shall be presumed to be the centre of
its main interests, in the absence of proof of the contrary.” EIR, supra note 34, at art. 3.
100 Menjucq & Reinhard Dammann, supra note 49, at 148.
101 Report from the Commission to the European Parliament, the Council and the European Economic
and Social Committee, on the application of Council Regulation (EC) No 1346/2000 of 29 May 2000 on
Insolvency Proceedings, at 15 COM (2012) 743 final (Dec. 12, 2012) [hereinafter Insolvency Report].
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nations may take a stricter view of this presumption.102 Interdil tempered the
harshness of Eurofood, to allow COMI based on the parent company’s
location, but only if the parent company’s COMI was objectively observable
by the subsidiary’s creditors.103 There are no concrete rules for determining
what the ascertainable facts to myriad creditors will be.104 Corporate groups
may also strategically migrate their COMI for more advantageous insolvency
law.105 There is no data to demonstrate whether creditors, particularly of the
largest corporate groups, are truly confused as to with which member of the
group they are dealing.106 Thus, it is difficult to predict when the strong
presumption may be rebutted.107
The EIR does not include an express duty for a court to investigate whether
it has proper jurisdiction before initiating a main proceeding.108 This is
problematic because it gives too much leverage to a corporate group to choose
its COMI, but also incentivizes the opening of secondary proceedings when the
main proceedings began in a sub-optimal jurisdiction for the group. Because
secondary proceedings are limited to winding up proceedings,109 this
minimizes the effectiveness of reorganizations. This may happen because of a
lack of communication and no centralized information repository for
insolvency proceedings in other E.U. member states.110

102 E.g., INSOL INT’L, CROSS-BORDER INSOLVENCY II: A GUIDE TO RECOGNITION AND ENFORCEMENT
34–35 (2012).
103 Id.
104 See Gabriel Moss & Michael Haravon, “Building Europe”—the French Case Law on COMI, 20
INSOLVENCY INTELLIGENCE 20, 22 (2007) (explaining that courts in the United Kingdom, Germany, Hungary,
Italy and France have adopted the “head office functions” as a guide).
105 E.g., In re Hellas Telecommunications (Luxembourg) II SCA [2009] EWHC 3199 (Ch) (the
Luxembourg-based Wind Hellas Telecoms re-registered in England three months before opening insolvency
proceedings).
106 Westbrook, supra note 91, at 1036.
107 See Ragan, supra note 80, at 133.
108 EC Impact Assessment, supra note 58, at 5 (discussing that there is no such requirement in the EIR).
However, some courts do dismiss cases for lack of jurisdiction. See, e.g., Teresa Camacho & Alberto NunezLagos Burguera, Secondary Proceedings: Are Cross-Border Insolvencies in the EU Dealt with Efficiently?, 2
INT’L INSOLVENCY REV. 140, 145 & n. 10 (2013) (citing Judgment issued by the Commercial Court No. 1 of
Bilbao on 13 Dec. 2011, auto 528/2011).
109 See supra text accompanying notes 48–52.
110 See Camacho & Burguera, supra note 108, at 143–44.
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2. U.S. Approach
In contrast to the EIR, the U.S. Code says a court must determine the
COMI upon the commencement of proceedings.111 Recently, a court clarified
commencement is different from recognition, even if the COMI may have
changed in the interim.112 For a proceeding to be recognized, it must be
classified as either a foreign main (those in the debtor’s COMI) or non-main
proceeding.113
The U.S. approach to determining the COMI is a “command and control
test.”114 In re Bear Stearns noted the presumption of registration is helpful
when there is no serious controversy, but listed a number of alternate factors to
determine the COMI:
the location of the debtor’s headquarters; the location of those who
actually manage the debtor (which, conceivably could be the
headquarters of a holding company); the location of the debtor’s
primary assets; the location of the majority of the debtor’s creditors
or of a majority of the creditors who would be affected by the case;
115
and/or the jurisdiction whose law would apply to most disputes.

The District Court’s affirmed the bankruptcy court and favorably quoted these
factors.116
Prior to chapter 15, the concept of COMI was unknown in the U.S.,117 but
it resembles the principle place of business test used in civil procedure, which

111

In re Betcorp Ltd., 400 B.R. 266, 291–92 (Bankr. D. Nev. 2009).
In re Kemsley, No. 12-13570 JMP, 2013 WL 1164930 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y Mar. 22, 2013) (“It did not
matter that, after these insolvency proceedings were commenced, the debtor’s wife moved with their children
back to the UK and the debtor allegedly began to think of repatriating to be with his children, since the
debtor’s COMI had to be determined as of the date the foreign proceedings commenced, not when recognition
was sought.”). But see In re Fairfield Sentry Ltd., No. 11-4376., 2013 WL 1593348 (2d Cir. Apr. 16, 2013)
(“But given the EU Regulation and other international interpretations, which focus on the regularity and
ascertainability of a debtor’s COMI, a court may consider the period between the commencement of the
foreign insolvency proceeding and the filing of the Chapter 15 petition to ensure that a debtor has not
manipulated its COMI in bad faith.”).
113 11 U.S.C. § 1502(4).
114 In re Betcorp, 400 B.R. at 290; In re Bear Stearns High-Grade Structured Credit Strategies Master
Fund, Ltd., 374 B.R. 122, 126–32 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y 2007), aff’d 389 B.R. 325 (S.D.N.Y 2008); In re Sphinx,
351 B.R. 103, 117–21(Bankr. S.D.N.Y. 2006); Gropper, supra note 19.
115 In re Bear Stearns 374 B.R. at 128 (citing In re Sphinx, 351 B.R. at 117).
116 Id. at 336 (citing additional cases which relied on these factors: In re Ernst & Young, Inc., 383 B.R.
773, 779 (Bankr.D. Colo. 2008); In re Basis Yield Alpha Fund (Master), 381 B.R. 37, 47 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y.
2008); In re Loy, 380 B.R. 154, 162 (Bankr. E.D. Va. 2007)).
112
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looks at where the majority of the group’s operations take place.118 This test is
not as rigid as the EIR’s rebuttable presumption, but it still emphasizes the
predictability to third parties.
3. A Combined Approach
The E.U. approach of relying on registration and objective factors evident
to creditors presents problems for determining a corporate group-wide COMI,
particularly given the emphasis on respecting legal separateness. The head
office approach would still be ascertainable for creditors.119 Several European
courts followed this test for successful group proceedings.120 The more flexible
approach also caters to a wider range of corporate group structures. There may
be complex cases where court involvement is necessary to adjudge the COMI,
but these cases would be the exception, not the rule. A determination that the
chosen COMI is appropriate should be made early in the process.
Despite the problem in determining E.U. corporate groups COMI and no
mechanism by which to consolidate proceedings, several corporate groups
have successfully had single proceedings in the home of the parent.121
Examples include Daisytek and Nortel.122
C. Procedural Consolidation
Procedural consolidation is the consolidation of all proceedings into a
single proceeding, to allow for a common claims procedure and prevent the
disturbance of the group’s assets and debts.123 In the U.S., and in Canada,
117 See Mark Lightner, Determining the Center of Main Interests Under Chapter 15, 18 NORTON J.
BANKR. L. & PRAC. 519, 521 (3d ed. 2009) (“Bankruptcy courts have struggled somewhat to define COMI, in
part because COMI was not, before BAPCPA, part of American law.”).
118 See Hertz Corp. v. Friend, 559 U.S. 77 (2009) (defining a corporation’s principal place of business for
determining diversity jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. 1332(c)(1) as its “nerve center”); see also Bennett Truck
Transp. LLC v. Tri-Continental Exch. Ltd. (In re Tri-Continental Exch. Ltd.), 349 B.R. 627 (Bankr. E.D. Cal.
2006) (explaining that the drafters chose COMI over the principal place of business for consistency with other
countries’ terminology).
119 See Mevorach, supra note 89, at 403.
120 Gabriel Moss & Tom Smith, Commentary on Council Regulation 1346/ 2000 on Insolvency
Proceedings, in THE EC REGULATION ON INSOLVENCY PROCEEDINGS—A COMMENTARY AND ANNOTATED
GUIDE, (Gabriel Moss et al., eds. 2009) (noting Eurotunnel, Collins & Aikman, Hettlage AG & CO KG,
EMTEC).
121 Mevorach, supra note 61, at 194 (citing several examples).
122 Gallagher, supra note 96, at 79.
123 See Sarra, supra note 92, at 656; see also Christoph G. Paulus, Group Insolvencies—Some Thoughts
About New Approaches, 42 TEX. INT’L L.J. 819, 826 (2007).
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procedural consolidation is commonplace. Several other countries have
provisions for it, but the EIR does not.124 Procedural consolidation allows a
corporate group to have a common court filing, a single set of notices, a
common administrator, and joint proceedings; however, the individual legal
entities can retain their separate insolvency estates and create different
reorganization plans.125
In the E.U., the lack of an explicit procedural consolidation provision
creates inefficient proceedings: the E.U. estimates that 700 companies with
multi-national subsidiaries open hundreds of secondary proceedings.126
Because U.S. law authorizes the commencement of a case in the same
bankruptcy court for affiliated entities,127 secondary proceedings are rare.128
U.S. Federal Rule of Bankruptcy Procedure 2009(a) allows for the election of a
single trustee to preside over the joint process.129 Consolidation reduces
transactional costs.130
The EIR allows secondary proceedings only for winding up proceedings,
and courts do not have to determine whether opening secondary proceedings is
reasonable or advisable.131 Courts should consider efficient administration of
the overall estate.132 Courts exercising discretion to determine best interests
would minimize abusive proceedings.133 Additionally, the EIR could allow
secondary proceedings for more than winding up procedures, to avoid
compromising a group restructuring and forcing liquidation.
Although proceedings in the U.S. may be consolidated into one proceeding,
cross-border enforcement of those judgments is subject to recognition of the
U.S. court’s findings. Recently, in Rubin Finance,134 the English Supreme
124 Heribert Hirte, Towards a Framework for the Regulation of Corporate Groups’ Insolvencies, 5 EURO.
CO. & FIN. L. REV. 213, 218–19 (2008) (noting Germany, Hungary, France, and Spain have allowed corporate
group procedural consolidations).
125 Bufford, supra note 2, at 737.
126 EC Impact Assessment, supra note 58, at 6.
127 28 U.S.C. § 1408 (2006).
128 Bufford, supra note 2, at 737.
129 MEVORACH, supra note 71 at 160.
130 Bufford, supra note 2, at 709–10; see also Rasmussen, supra note 76, at 989 (citing In re UAL Corp.,
No. 02-B-48191, 2006 WL 6593116 (Bankr. N.D. Ill. Jan 3, 2006) (28 petitions consolidated into one); In
re Sea Containers Ltd., No. 06-11156, 2009 WL 2208128 (Bankr. D. Del. Oct. 15, 2006); In re Calpine, No.
05-60200 (BRL), 2007 WL 685595, at *2-3 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. Mar. 5, 2007)).
131 Camacho & Burguera, supra note 108, at 144.
132 Id.
133 Id. at 147.
134 Rubin v Eurofinance S.A. [2012] UKSC 46.
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Court refused to recognize the U.S. court judgment.135 The court rejected the
argument that a universalist policy compelled enforcement, and instead noted
there was no basis in English law to enforce the foreign law upon third parties
(in this instance, an avoidance action).136 The court emphasized that the Model
Law does not extend to enforcing judgments on third parties in personam.137
The impact of this ruling is yet to be seen.138 The case leaves questions on how
to handle a E.U.-U.S. insolvency proceedings: even if a debtor files a
consolidated proceeding in the U.S., all parties involved may be weary of a
series of appeals and the inability to get recognition of U.S. judgments in E.U.
countries. Rubin Finance was a departure from precedent,139 and the dissent
noted it deviated from modified universalism’s principles that had long guided
English insolvency proceedings.140 Another case, Waste2Energy, issued just
weeks before Rubin Finance, but with distinct facts,141 expresses that offshore
jurisdictions are embracing universalism.142 These opinions creates some
confusion for UK practitioners, but proposed amendments to the EIR may
provide clarification between the two cases.143
D. Substantive Consolidation
While procedural consolidations are common in the U.S., a more
controversial approach to dealing with corporate groups is substantive
consolidation, which abolishes the barriers between legal entities and
consolidates them into one entity. Dismantling the pre-established legal
separateness may not offer a broad solution, but can be useful in limited
circumstances.

135

Id.
Id.
137 Paul Atherton, United Kingdom: UK Supreme Court Rules on Cross-Border Insolvencies, MONDAQ,
Mar. 25, 2013, http://www.mondaq.com/x/224122/Insolvency+Bankruptcy/UK+Supreme+Court+Rules+On+
CrossBorder+Insolvencies.
138 David L. Barrack & Beret L. Flom, U.K. Court’s Impact on Cross-Border Insolvency Landscape, AM.
BANKR. INST. J., Apr. 2013, at 52, 100.
139 The decision overruled Cambridge Gas Transportation Corp. v Official Comm. of Unsecured
Creditors of Navigator Holdings Plc. [2006] UKPC 26.
140 Rubin v Eurofinance S.A. [2012] UKSC 46; New Cap Reinsurance Corp & Anor v Grant & Ors
[2012] UKSC 46.
141 Interdevelco Limited v. Waste2Energy Group Holdings PLC, High Court of Justice of the Isle of Man,
CHP 12/0056, Decision 10th Oct. 2012, available at www.judgments.im/content/j1185.htm.
142 Wayne P. Weitz & Tally M. Wiener, Offshore Jurisdictions Embrace Universalism in Waste2energy,
AM. BANKR. INST. J., Apr. 2013, at 42, 118.
143 Frank Tschentscher, A Change of Direction for English Cross-Border Insolvency Law, AM. BANKR.
INST. J., Feb. 2013, at 38, 39.
136
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U.S. courts have consolidated entities on limited occasions.144 The term
“substantive consolidation” does not appear anywhere in the U.S. Code, but
courts have exercised their equitable powers under 11 U.S.C. § 105, when they
deem it necessary.145 In re Owens-Corning146 set the standard for substantive
consolidation. It should be a rare tool used only when the legal separateness of
the entities prepetition was a mere formality; because assets and liabilities were
so intertwined, creditors recognized no borders between the entities and it
would not benefit them to respect the separateness of the entities.147
Substantive consolidation is often employed as a tool of partial integration,
or “de facto substantive consolidation.”148 This may be practically applied
when entities are legally distinct, but their finances are so intertwined that
disentanglement proves impossible.149 Thus, “de facto” substantive
consolidation could be a useful tool for corporate group insolvencies to
minimize the number of proceedings without a broad rule razing entity
separateness.150
III. COST EFFICIENCY & SINGLE PROCEEDINGS
Insolvency’s goal of maximizing creditor wealth is best achieved by
minimizing unnecessary transaction and ex post insolvency costs.151 A
controlling policy for maintaining corporate group insolvencies would resolve
the conflicts between separate legal entities and creditors in favor of the
maximum benefit for all creditors. While such a result is not impossible under
the current regime, it is not guaranteed.152 This Part explains the economic
theory of why individual creditors sacrificing their purported rights would
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Weitz & Wiener, supra note 142, at 42.
Eastgroup Props. v. S. Motel Ass’n, Ltd., 935 F.2d 245, 248 (11th Cir. 1991); accord First Nat’l Bank
of El Dorado v. Giller (In re Giller), 962 F.2d 796 (8th Cir. 1992); Union Savings Bank v. Augie/Restivo
Baking Co., Ltd. (In re Augie/Restivo Baking Co., Ltd.), 860 F.2d 515 (2d Cir. 1988); In re Vecco Constr.
Indus., 4 B.R. 407 (Bankr. E.D. Va. 1980).
146 In re Owens Corning, 419 F.3d 195 (3d Cir. 2005) (amended 2007).
147 Id. at 211.
148 Jacob Ziegel, Canada-United States Cross-Border Insolvency Relations and the UNCITRAL Model
Law, 32 BROOK. J. INT’L L. 1041, 1050 (2007).
149 See id.
150 See infra Part III.D.3. (discussing General Growth Properties as an example of de facto substantive
consolidation).
151 SAMUEL L. BUFFORD ET AL., UNITED STATES INTERNATIONAL INSOLVENCY LAW 2008–2009, 21–22
(2009); MEVORACH, supra note 71, at 107.
152 See supra Part II.B.1. (citing examples of cases where a single COMI was achieved despite no law
requiring it); infra Part III.B.1. (discussing examples of cases with good outcomes).
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ultimately benefit them, other creditors, and the economy overall. It then goes
on to discuss the impact of corporate groups’ size on the costs of the
proceedings: the time it takes to wind up and the direct fees to professionals
involved. This Part also highlights several group insolvencies, which provide
insight on factors that determine insolvency proceedings’ efficiency or lack
thereof.
A. Economic Theories of Single Proceeding Efficiency
A standardized policy for dealing with corporate groups would not only
provide a framework to efficiently conclude proceedings, but stabilize ex ante
capital markets by minimizing uncertainties in the event of future
insolvencies.153 This Subpart discusses the harms of uncertainty absent a policy
of efficient proceedings. The Collins & Aikman insolvency demonstrates how
and why competing interests can coordinate to achieve an efficient outcome.
The specter of feuding creditors opening numerous proceedings,
prolonging proceedings, and diminishing overall value and return to creditors
could be detracting for a potential creditor.154 Uncertainty can also have the
negative market effects of decreasing ex ante credit, increasing the associated
interest rates, and creating economic deadweight.155 It could deter “the free
flow of capital among counties and creates a disincentive to investment across
borders.”156
Uncertainty diminishes incentives for cooperation between creditors.
Absent a guarantee that other creditors will not attempt to open secondary
proceedings, any creditor with a viable claim under Article 5157 faces an
anticommons problem—if every creditor is grabbing for their own best
interest, why would one creditor sacrifice its own interests for the corporate
group’s collective good?158 However, when parties do not coordinate for a
common goal,159 they each attain suboptimal results.160 One means to avoid

153 See David C. Webb, The Importance of Incomplete Information in Explaining the Existence of Costly
Bankruptcy, 54 ECONOMICA 279, 279 (1987).
154 Id.
155 Lawrence A. Weiss, Bankruptcy Resolution: Direct Costs and Violation of Priority of Claims, 27 J.
FIN. ECON. 285, 285 (1990); Bebchuk & Guzman, supra note 4, at 779–80.
156 Altman, supra note 12.
157 See supra Part I.D.
158 Mevorach, supra note 89, at 371.
159 BOB WESSELS, BRUCE A. MARKELL & JASON J. KILBORN, INTERNATIONAL COOPERATION IN
BANKRUPTCY AND INSOLVENCY MATTERS 167 (2009).
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this problem are private protocols—private guarantees that the proceedings
will follow the planned route.161
While individual creditors may object to the idea of a single proceeding,
efficient consolidation puts the interests of all the creditors above those of an
individual creditor. Theoretically, an individual creditor’s abrogated rights
under the local law would be mitigated by the overall increase in the enterprise
asset maximization from a single proceeding in a different jurisdiction.162 The
creditor would be in no worse a position than it would have been under local
law. This is known as the “rough wash theory.”163
The Collins & Aikman164 insolvency exemplifies an efficient global sale
and the rough wash theory. Collins & Aikman was an automotive parts
supplier.165 Twenty-four companies in nine E.U. states were consolidated into
one centralized proceeding in England.166 Though the COMI could have been
one of many places in Europe, the company filed in England, and once
proceedings were initiated, the English-appointed joint administrators took
quick action to contact creditors throughout the continent, and request they not
open secondary proceedings.167 The administrators assured these creditors that
the main proceeding in England would respect what their financial positions
would have been, had the proceedings taken place under their local law.168
Reviewing these assurances, the court considered the equitable nature of
insolvency proceedings and found no reason why it could not abide by the
administrators’ guarantees.169
One of Collins & Aikman’s larger creditors was U.S. based J.P. Morgan.
J.P. Morgan would have been benefited more under U.S. priority law than
under English law. Nonetheless, J.P. Morgan submitted to the court a letter of

160 See Robert B. Ahdieh, The Visible Hand: Coordination Functions of the Regulatory State, 95 MINN. L.
REV. 578, 618 (2010).
161 See discussion infra Part IV.A.
162 Jay Lawrence Westbrook, Theory and Pragmatism in Global Insolvencies: Choice of Law and Choice
of Forum, 65 AM. BANKR. L. J. 457, 464–66 (1991).
163 Id.
164 Re Collins & Aikman Europe SA, [2006] EWHC 1343 (Ch).
165 Id.
166 Id. However, German law may sometimes require substantive consolidation, with a single
administrative for the groups. See supra note 75 and accompanying text.
167 Id.
168 Id.
169 Id.
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support for the proposed deal and agreed not to open secondary proceedings.170
J.P. Morgan explained that foregoing any further actions and completing the
sale on the administrators’ proposed terms would be a better deal for it in the
end.171 Ultimately, Collins & Aikman liquidated for $45 million more than
estimated.172 The case is haled as a model for how to complete single corporate
group proceedings.173
B. The Impact of a Debtor’s Size on Efficiency
Economies of scale operate in insolvency proceedings. Larger enterprises
will absorb costs because the fixed costs of insolvency will be the same
regardless of the size of the debtor, but are less significant relative to the size
of the entire debtor. Several studies have sought to prove that there is a
correlation between the size of the debtor and a reduction in costs of
bankruptcy.174 However, such studies acknowledge that insolvencies are
complex, with too many variables to do a fair comparison.175 Furthermore,
there are questions about how one defines the debtor’s size: assets, assets and
liabilities, employees, or more qualitative factors.176
Capitalizing on the size and leverage effect,177 a corporate group, if
reorganized in a centralized manner, is more likely to continue as a going
concern. In the U.S., the general policy is to favor reorganization because of its
macroeconomic benefits. Despite the macroeconomic benefits, liquidation is

170

Id.
Id.
172 Id.
173 See, e.g., Gabriel Moss QC, Group Insolvency-Choice of Forum and Law: The European Experience
Under the Influence of English Pragmatism, 32 BROOK. J. INT’L L. 1005, 1018 (2007). Even this case, despite
its overll efficiency, had one secondary proceeding open in Austria. Id.
174 E.g., Oscar Couwenberg & Stephen J. Lubben, The Costs of Chapter 11 in Context: American and
Dutch Business Bankruptcy, 85 AM. BANKR. L.J. 63 (2011); Abe De Jong & Oscar Couwenberg, Costs and
Recovery Rates in the Dutch Liquidation-Based Bankruptcy System, 26 EURO. J. L. ECON. 105–27 (2008)
(finding that with a 1% increase in the size of a debtor, professional fees grow by less than 0.05%, all else
equal); Dewaelheyns & Van Hulle, supra note 78, at 912–15; Nico Dewaelheyns & Cynthia Van Hulle,
Filtering Speed in A Continental European Reorganization Procedure, 29 INT’L REV. L. & ECON. 375, 383
(2009).
175 See, e.g., Dewaelheyns & Van Hulle, Filtering Speed, supra note 174; De Jong & Couwenberg, supra
note 174.
176 Stephen J. Lubben, What We “Know” About Chapter 11 Cost Is Wrong, 17 FORDHAM J. CORP. & FIN.
L. 141, 159–61 (2012).
177 See infra Part III.C.
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generally cheaper from the creditor’s perspective.178 However, one study
concluded that chapter 7 (liquidation) is no less costly than chapter 11
(reorganization) proceedings, but the latter preserves assets better and
creditors’ returns are far greater.179 With the cooperation of creditors in
reorganizing, not only would the debtor and the economy benefit, so would the
creditors themselves.
Unlike the U.S.’s policy favoring reorganization, the EIR’s structure
encourages liquidation. Article 27 says secondary proceedings may only be
opened for liquidation proceedings, which makes restructuring challenging.180
The challenge can be exacerbated by the uncertainty of whether secondary
proceedings will be opened. Liquidating chunks of the group while trying to
preserve a going concern may prove next to impossible. 181
The preference for liquidations is beginning to be counteracted by the
increasing use of coordinated insolvency proceedings across subsidiaries.182
Forcing liquidation instead of reorganization sacrifices the benefits gained by
forming corporate groups.183
C. Speed & Costs of Proceedings
The ability to go in and out of insolvency quickly will minimize both the
direct and indirect costs of bankruptcy. While the complexities of corporate
groups’ structures may complicate proceedings, the structures may allow for
more rapid restructuring. Avoiding secondary proceedings will minimize the
time and expense of having to cooperate between more parties and duplicate
efforts. It will also limit the need to incur more professional fees (such as
liquidators, attorneys, and accountants), who charge high rates for complex
group matters.
178 Reorganizations involve tremendous costs. See Douglas G. Baird, The Uneasy Case for Corporate
Reorganizations, 15 J. LEGAL STUD. 127 (1986); Kevin A. Kordana & Eric A. Posner, A Positive Theory of
Chapter 11, 74 N.Y.U. L. REV. 161 (1999); Stephen J. Lubben, The Direct Costs of Corporate Reorganization:
An Empirical Examination of Professional Fees in Large Chapter 11 Cases, 74 AM. BANKR. L.J. 509 (2000);
Stephen J. Lubben, Some Realism About Reorganization: Explaining the Failure of Chapter 11 Theory, 106
DICK. L. REV. 267 (2001).
179 Arturo Bris, Ivo Welch, & Ning Zhu, The Costs of Bankruptcy: Chapter 7 Liquidation versus Chapter
11 Reorganization, 61 J. FIN. 1253 (2006).
180 EIR, supra note 34, at art. 27.
181 This preference toward liquidation is being counteracted by the increasing use of coordinated activities
across subsidiaries. EC Impact Assessment, supra note 58, at 8.
182 Id. at 4.
183 BOB WESSELS, INTERNATIONAL INSOLVENCY LAW 15 (3d ed. 2012).
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Based on the leverage effect and the flexibility of corporate groups,184
corporate groups are more likely to structure a deal that is more attractive to
prospective buyers or future creditors.185 Groups are sold faster than standalone firms.186 Groups are more quickly able to find buyers for their troubled
subsidiary than an individual company would be.187 However, correlation
between speed of the proceedings and return to creditors depends on the firm’s
financial condition.188 A firm in poorer health will more likely be pushed into
liquidation regardless of whether this will yield the highest return.189 The
length of the proceedings logically correlates with direct costs incurred. But
even if length is not correlated to the direct costs, it has an effect on ex post
costs (such as goodwill and managerial behavior).190
Resolving the insolvency through a single proceeding would expedite the
proceedings and help save on costs. Parallel proceedings are likely to trigger
inter-creditor disputes on points of law and proliferate proceeding time and
litigation costs.191 In the E.U., the estimated cost of a secondary proceeding for
a foreign creditor is €2000–5000 (this includes costs of reviewing, defining
priority rights, compiling documents, liaising between courts).192 The E.U.’s
Impact Statement Survey indicates that more effective coordination could more
than halve these costs.193 Additionally, avoiding multiple proceedings will
reduce the need for the duplication of costs.

184

Supra Part II.A.
Id.
186 Dewaelheyns & Van Hulle, Filtering Speed, supra note 174, at 383.
187 Douglas C. Baird & Robert K. Rasmussen, The End of Bankruptcy, 55 STAN. L. REV. 751, 778 (2002);
Bufford, supra note 39, at 485 (citing English forklift manufacturer Lancer Boss as an example of a piecemeal
sale which received less than it would have through a sale of assets integrated with those of its German
subsidiary).
188 Dewaelheyns & Van Hulle, Filtering Speed, supra note 174, at 383 (noting that data may be skewed
because creditors will push liquidation for unhealthier firms).
189 See id.
190 John Armour et al., The Costs and Benefits of Secured Creditor Control in Bankruptcy: Evidence from
the UK 10–11 (Univ. of Cambridge Centre for Bus. Research, Working Paper No. 332) (Mar. 1, 2009),
available at http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=912302.
191 Jason J. Kilborn, The Raging Debate Between Territorial and Universal Theories of Value Sharing in
International Bankruptcy, in WESSELS, MARKELL, & KILBORN, supra note 163.
192 Commission Staff Working Document Impact Assessment accompanying the document Revision of
Regulation (EC) No 1346/2000 on Insolvency Proceedings, at 29 COM (2012) 416 final (Dec. 12, 2012).
193 Id.
185

WOUTERSRAYKIN GALLEYS2

2013]

6/27/2013 1:34 PM

CROSS-BORDER INSOLVENCIES

413

1. Liquidators
In the universalist scenario, there would be one lead liquidator who will
receive fees as agreed upon. The liquidator’s fee arrangement would be based
upon the laws and customs of the COMI. Liquidators receive fees based on the
funds recovered (typically 3% or 5%) or at an hourly rate.194 If secondary
proceedings are unavoidable, a lead liquidator may need to apportion fees to
another liquidator, thereby increasing costs. However, a lead liquidator should
have the ability to intervene in non-main proceedings; prevent them from
occurring unnecessarily; and most importantly, ensure that secondary
proceedings do not contravene the interests of the corporate group.195 The EIR
has a duty for cooperation amongst liquidators,196 but a definite hierarchy
which allows one liquidator to take control of proceedings and minimize costs
would be beneficial.
2. Attorneys & Other Professionals
In a complicated case, a debtor will hire both financial advisors197 and
lawyers.198 In both the U.S. and E.U., professional fees require authorization,
but jurisdictions vary on how and to whom such authorization is granted.199
Furthermore, between E.U. countries, laws may dictate different fee structures
for liquidators and administrators. The rules for liquidators also differ between
the U.S. and E.U.
A larger corporate group will have more contracts, employees, assets, and
other issues to deal with, and professionals set their rates based on the
estimated, or the actual time the matters require.200 A complex cross-border
case can be very lucrative for the professionals, because it requires proceedings
in different courts and fee schedules under different legal regimes.201 Studies
have indicated that the debtor’s size and the number of professionals retained
have a greater impact on the total fees incurred than the speed of the

194

John Armour et al., supra note 190, at 11–12.
Legislative Guide, supra note 65, at 9, 19–20.
196 EIR, supra note 34, at art. 31; Legislative Guide, supra note 56, at 6–7.
197 Stephen J. Lubben, The Chapter 11 Financial Advisors, 28 EMORY BANKR. DEV. J. 11 (2011).
198 Stephen J. Lubben, The Chapter 11 Attorneys, 84 AM. BANKR. L.J. 447 (2012).
199 Couwenberg & Lubben, supra note 174.
200 Lubben, supra note 176, at 168.
201 Lynn M. LoPucki & Joseph W. Doherty, Professional Overcharging in Large Bankruptcy
Reorganization Cases, 5 J. EMPIRICAL LEGAL STUDS. 983, 1010–11 (2008).
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proceedings.202 Avoiding secondary proceedings and the need to hire
redundant professionals per country will minimize costs.
D. Case Examples
Each corporate group case offers unique circumstances that make their
outcomes difficult to compare.203 Projecting a baseline empirical outcome
before insolvency proceedings may prove difficult, and any assumptions made
may prove faulty as the proceedings unwind. However, based on the discussion
above, there are several objective factors that serve as indicia of successful
proceedings. Such indicia include single proceedings (or at least minimizing
secondary proceedings), successful cooperation, limiting the length of
proceedings, and minimal professional fees incurred.
1. Global Sales
A sale of all the assets of an insolvent group proves the easiest route for
successful evaluation: comparison of the projected value of assets and the sale
price. Collins & Aikman was one such example.204 In re Smurfit-Stone
Container Corp.205 is an example of a successful U.S.-Canada insolvency.
Smurfit-Stone was one of North America’s leading packaging
manufacturers.206 It employed over 20,000 people.207 In its insolvency, there
were two proceedings opened, in Delaware and Canada on the same day.208
The courts approved a cross-border protocol between the Delaware and
Canadian courts.209 The company was able to exit bankruptcy in less than
seven months.210 Upon doing so, it was sold to Rock Tenn Co. for $3.5 billion.

202 Stephen J. Lubben, Corporate Reorganization & Professional Fees, 82 AM. BANKR. L.J. 77, 80 (2008)
(“time spent in chapter 11 seems to have very little independent effect on the costs of the case. Factors like the
size of the debtor corporation, the number of professionals retained, and whether a committee is appointed
play much bigger roles”).
203 See supra text accompanying note 178.
204 Supra text accompanying notes 168–77.
205 In re Smurfit-Stone Container Corp., No. 09-10235 (BLS), 2010 WL 2403793 (Bankr. D. Del. June
11, 2010).
206 Id. at *1.
207 Amir Kurtovic, Bankruptcy Aids Smurfit-Stone Value in Rare Deal: Biggest Deals of 2011, ST. LOUIS
BUS. J. (Dec. 16, 2011), available at http://www.bizjournals.com/stlouis/print-edition/2011/12/16/bankruptcyaids-smurfit-stone-value-in.html?page=all.
208 In re Smurfit, 2010 WL 2403793, at *1.
209 Order Approving Cross-Border Insolvency Protocol, In re Smurfit-Stone Container Corp., No. 0910235 (Bankr. D. Del Mar. 12, 2009).
210 Kurtovic, supra note 207.
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This value was higher than expected during the bankruptcy and about a 27%
premium to shareholders.211 Though the case was a parallel proceeding, the
two courts’ actions were in full coordination with one and another and offer an
example of successful protocols.212
On the other hand, one of the E.U.’s first insolvencies under the EIR,
KPNQwest, was a cross-border sale that garnered creditors significantly less
than there likely would been under a single coordinated procedure. KPNQwest
owned cables across several European countries.213 The parent company was in
the Netherlands, but several subsidiaries in other E.U. member states opened
proceedings.214 The Dutch trustee did not have power to coordinate the
subsidiaries’ proceedings.215 Each proceeding had its own representative and
liquidations took place in a disaggregate form.216 Each representative took the
course that he thought would elicit the highest returns for the creditors.217
Thus, the representatives acted without consideration that the assets’ value in
that nation were only a component of a more valuable cross-border entity. The
sale proceeds were lower than had liquidations resolved as a single unit.218
2. Complications in Proceedings
Other cases that involved complex issues (fraud), such as Stanford Bank219
and Lernout & Hauspie,220 have created further problems for insolvency
proceedings. In Stanford International Bank, the English court refused to
recognize the U.S. court-appointed receiver as a foreign representative or

211

Id.
CROSS-BORDER INSOLVENCY PROTOCOL IN RE SMURFIT-STONE CONTAINER CANADA INC., http://
iiiglobal.com, http://www.iiiglobal.org/component/jdownloads/viewdownload/573/1824.html (last visited May
20, 2013).
213 Robert van Galen, The European Insolvency Regulation and Groups of Companies, available at
http://www.iiiglobal.org/country/european_union.html; Eva M.F. de Vette, Multinational Enterprise Groups in
insolvency: How Should the European Union Act?, 7 UTRECH L. REV. (2011); Lynn M. LoPucki, Global and
Out of Control?, 79 AM. BANKR. L.J. 79, 96–97 (2005).
214 LoPucki, supra note 213, at 96.
215 Robert van Galen, The European Insolvency Regulation and Groups of Companies, at INSOL Europe
Annual Congress (Oct. 16–18, 2003) (available at www.insol-europe.org/download/file/575).
216 de Vette, supra note 213.
217 Id.
218 Id.
219 Stanford Int’l Bank Ltd. [2009] EWHC 1441 (Ch).
220 Stonington Partners, Inc. v. Lernout & Hauspie Speech Products N.V., 310 F.3d 118, 133 (3d Cir.
2002).
212
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recognize the proceedings as a collective proceeding because of the
involvement of the Securities and Exchange Commission to prevent fraud.221
Nortel Networks is another case that receives both positive and negative
evaluations. Positively, Nortel was a successful universalist proceeding.222
Nortel employed 30,000 people, with operations and customers across 150
countries.223 The parent company filed in Canada, the European subsidiaries
filed in the U.K., and the U.S. subsidiaries filed in Delaware.224 The Delaware
bankruptcy court recognized the Canadian and the U.K. proceedings as foreign
main proceedings under chapter 15, on the premise that Canada was the COMI
of the Nortel parent and the U.K. was the COMI of the European
subsidiaries.225 The three proceedings were able to successfully facilitate the
sale of Nortel’s extensive patent assets.226 Nortel would have been very
complicated in the disaggregated form because of how intertwined the assets of
the company (networks) were. Nonetheless, after the sales, there were still
disputes between the different affiliates with competing interests.227 The result
has been ongoing litigation in different countries, and a boon for the
professionals who continue getting fees from the estates.228
3. U.S. Proceedings
There are relatively few reported U.S. decisions involving inter-company
claims.229 When a proceeding is opened in the U.S., the chapter 11 plan will

221 U.N. Comm’n on Int’l Trade Law, Model Law on Cross-Border Insolvency: The Judicial Perspective
21 (Feb. 2012), http://www.uncitral.org/pdf/english/texts/insolven/V1188129-Judicial_Perspective_ebookE.pdf.
222 Scott Brown et al., Understanding Cross-border Issues in a Restructuring Situation at the American
Bankruptcy Institute Southwest Bankruptcy Conference (Sept. 9–10, 2009) (available at Westlaw 091009
ABI-CLE 331).
223 Id.
224 In re Nortel Networks, No. 09-10138-KG, 2011 WL 1154225 (Bankr. D. Del. Mar. 29, 2011); Re
Nortel Networks SA & ORS [2009] EWHC 206 (Ch).
225 Nortel’s Legal Mess Pits Bondholders Against Retirees, REUTERS.COM (Jan. 11, 2013, 4:45 PM),
http://www.reuters.com/article/2013/01/11/nortel-bankruptcy-mediation-idUSL1E9CBDMQ20130111.
226 Brown et al., supra note 222.
227 Allan L. Gropper, The Arbitration of Cross-Border Insolvencies, 86 AM. BANKR. L.J. 201, 214–15
(2012).
228 Carolyn Van Hasselt, Big Winners in Nortel’s Demise? Lawyers, WSJ.COM (Jan. 15, 2013, 12:18 PM),
http://blogs.wsj.com/canadarealtime/2013/01/15/big-winners-in-nortels-demise-lawyers/; Judge: Lehman Can
Pay $26 Million to Creditors’ Lawyers, WSJ.COM (Feb. 19, 2013, 12:55 PM), http://online.wsj.com/article/
SB10001424127887324449104578314201446721018.html.
229 Jacob Ziegel, Corporate Groups and Cross-Border Insolvencies: A Canada-United States Perspective,
7 FORDHAM J. CORP. & FIN. L. 367, 383 (2002).
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often deal with the claims to avoid post-proceedings litigation.230 Other U.S.
cases will reorganize, but have suboptimal results because of the complexity of
disjointed proceedings. One such example is Global Crossing.231 The company
ultimately reorganized successfully, but it was a very expensive proceeding
because it had parallel proceedings in the U.S. and Bermuda and required
coordination for each of the sixteen subsidiaries involved.232
In re General Growth Properties233 was a successful coordination of a
diffuse corporate group reorganization, in retrospect. However, the court’s
approach and the blurring of entity separateness garnered criticism.234 General
Growth was the second-largest mall owner in the U.S. with 180 properties in
forty-three states.235 The parent corporation managed properties throughout the
U.S. and had hundreds of subsidiaries.236 Creditors objected to including all of
the entities together, because the entities included Special Purpose Entities who
themselves were solvent, and the reorganization plan allowed all the cash to
flow upstream to the parent during the reorganization.237 The court nonetheless
approved the plan, which treated the debtor as a single entity.238 The court
stated that it was not substantively consolidating all the entities, but
consolidating the proceedings for administrative efficiency.239 The court
focused on whether the joint filing was in good faith, and one commentator has
suggested that evaluation of the good faith of the filing could be a model for
how a court could consider whether a de facto substantive consolidation240 is

230 See e.g., In re 360 Networks (USA), 282 B.R. 756 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. 2001); Urban Retail Properties v.
Loews Cineplex Etnm’t (In re Loews Cineplex Enm’t, No. 01. CIV.8946 (RGW), 2002 WL 53479 (Bankr.
S.D.N.Y. Apr. 9, 2002).
231 In re Global Crossing Ltd., 295 B.R. 726 (S.D.N.Y. 2003).
232 Merovach, supra note 81.
233 In re Gen. Growth Props., Inc., 409 B.R. 43 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. 2009).
234 See, e.g., Richard J. Corbi, How Remote is “Bankruptcy Remote” for Special Purpose Entities,
NORTON BANKR. L. ADVISER, Nov. 2009, at 5; Brian M. Resnick & Steven C. Krause, Not So BankruptcyRemote SPEs and In re General Growth Properties Inc., 28 AM. BANKR. INST. J. at 8, Oct. 2009; Forrest
Pearce, Comment, Bankruptcy-Remote Special Purpose Entities and A Business’s Right to Waive Its Ability to
File for Bankruptcy, 28 EMORY BANKR. DEV. J. 507 (2012); Samantha J. Rothman, Note, Lessons from
General Growth Properties: The Future of the Special Purpose Entity, 17 FORDHAM J. CORP. & FIN. L. 227
(2012); Kris Hudson & Lingling Wei, Move by General Growth Rattles Malls’ Investors, WALL ST. J., May 8,
2009, http:// online.wsj.com/article/SB124163910180492861.html.
235 In re Gen. Growth Props., Inc., 409 B.R. 43 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. 2009).
236 Id.
237 Pearce, supra note 234, at 513.
238 Id.
239 Corbi, supra note 234.
240 See supra Part III.
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appropriate for cross-border filings,241 since such an approach prioritizes the
interests of the group as a whole. Nonetheless, many creditors and scholars
have expressed concern because the creditors’ expectations that the Special
Purpose Entities would be treated separately were contravened.242 After the
bankruptcy, General Growth paid back its creditors in full, provided some
recovery to its shareholders, and spun off a large portion of its properties under
a new name.243
Despite the ample criticism of the court’s legal approach in General
Growth, the criticism does not undercut the economic benefit of its universalist
approach. While the integrity of the legal system is an important virtue, the
reorganization’s success should provoke some questioning of the insistence of
utmost respect to legal separateness. A better policy to unflagging reverence
would be one that considers creditors’ reasonable expectations but prioritizes
economic efficiency to legal formalities.
In the absence of a standardized policy for E.U.-U.S. cross-border
insolvencies, there are several private mechanisms and rules by which a
corporate group can ensure its proceedings maximize their efficiency and
minimize costs.
IV. GUIDELINES FOR E.U.-U.S. CROSS-BORDER INSOLVENCY CASES
Protocols are a means to achieve the efficient universalist goal absent laws.
Protocols are flexible tools which can reflect the needs of the parties and
ensure predictability and cooperation based on private agreement. This Part
discusses how protocols can be used effectively and discusses the first
successful worldwide protocol: Maxwell Communications. This Part then
discusses how the insolvency administrator can most efficiently execute the
insolvency given the considerations discussed above.

241 Robert W. Miller, Economic Integration: An American Solution to the Multinational Enterprise Group
Conundrum, 11 RICH. J. GLOBAL L. & BUS. 185, 235 (2012).
242 See sources cited supra note 233.
243 David McLaughlin & Brian Louis, Ackman Makes Long Bet on Property Reversal with Howard
Hughes, BLOOMBERG.COM (Oct. 15, 2010, 12:01 AM), http://www.bloomberg.com/news/2010-10-15/ackmanmakes-long-wager-on-property-reversal-wit4-general-growth-spinoff.html; General Growth Properties’
Reorganization Plan Is Approved, L.A. TIMES, Oct. 21, 2010, http://articles.latimes.com/2010/oct/21/business/
la-fi-general-growth-20101021.
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A. CoCo Guidelines
European Communication and Cooperation Guidelines for Cross-border
Insolvency244 (known as the “CoCo Guidelines”) provide guidance for dealing
with insolvencies that pans across several E.U. jurisdictions.245 The guidelines
provide clarity to items left vague in the EIR.246 These guidelines are not
binding, but are “a framework to realize the objective of enabling liquidators
and courts to efficiently and effectively operate in cross-border insolvency
proceedings.”247
The CoCo Guidelines outline the role of the liquidator, communication,
information exchange, notices, among many other things.248 Primarily, these
guidelines emphasize the collaborative spirit of the Article 31 of the EIR to
achieve efficiency.249 Although following the CoCo Guidelines help make
proceedings more efficient, the guidelines nonetheless recommend the use of
protocols to span aspects not covered in the guidelines.250
B. Protocols
Protocols are private agreements between the parties that are then endorsed
by the court.251 They help facilitate the proceedings, clarify expectations, and
add overall harmony to the insolvency proceedings.252 These agreements may
be oral or written, and range in their scope; they address the procedure but do
not decide substantive issues.253 The UNCITRAL Practice Guide encourages
the use of protocols and also for transnational courts to cooperate together to
approve and successful execute these protocols.254 Ideally, these agreements
would be reached prior to the commencement of any proceedings; however
244

See generally Wessels & Virgós, supra note 87.
Bob Wessels, European Communication and Cooperation Guidelines for Cross-Border Insolvency:
Also of Interest for North-American Practitioners and Judges, 4 ABI COMM. NEWS: INT’L COMM. (Nov. 2007),
available at http://www.abiworld.org/committees/newsletters/international/vol4num4/European.html.
246 Id.
247 Id.
248 Wessels & Virgós, supra note 88.
249 Wessels, supra note 245.
250 Id; see infra Part IV.B (describing protocols).
251 Janis Sarra, Maidum’s Challenge, Legal and Governance Issues in Dealing with Cross-Border
Business Enterprise Group Insolvencies, 17 INT’L INSOLVENCY REV. 73, 84 (2008).
252 U.N. Comm’n on Int’l Trade Law, Practice Guide on Cross-Border Insolvency Cooperation, U.N.
Sales No. E.10.V.6, at 28 (2010), available at http://www.uncitral.org/pdf/english/texts/insolven/Practice_
Guide_Ebook_eng.pdf [hereinafter Practice Guide].
253 Id. at 28.
254 Id.
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this is not always possible because of the speed at which a corporate group’s
financial condition deteriorates.255
Implementing protocols not only gives parties a chance for efficient private
ordering, 256 but gives some guarantee of reducing the cost of litigation and
allows parties to focus on the insolvency proceedings during the case rather
than how to manage conflicts of law issues or cooperate with foreign parties.257
UNCITRAL estimates that in one notable case, Everfresh,258 the use of
protocols enhanced the value in the proceedings by over 40%.259 Examples of
successful protocol implementation are readily available as useful guidance.260
One of the most successful (and first) examples of a protocol for a
worldwide liquidation was Maxwell Communications.261 Maxwell filed for
chapter 11 in the U.S., and entered into a protocol with the English
administrators.262 The case involved $2 billion in assets and over $4 billion in
liabilities.263 Following the protocol, the U.S. examiner and the U.K.
administrator completed the proceedings with “unprecedented cooperation.”264
The protocol provided that all the assets would be pooled together, rather than
carved out for each court.265 Creditors in either country could then submit their
claims to their respective court.266 Despite the size of the assets at issue, there
were hardly any material conflicts, and the court described it as a “remarkable”
orderly liquidation.267
255

Id. at 31.
MEVORACH, supra note 71, at 174.
257 Janis Sarra, Crossing the Finish Line: the Potential Impact on Business Rescue of Adoption of new
Cross-Border Insolvency Provisions, Report to the Office of the Superintendent of Bankruptcy, available at
http://www.ic.gc.ca/eic/site/bsf-osb.nsf/vwapj/Crossing_the_Finish_Line-EN.pdf/$FILE/Crossing_the_Finish_
Line-EN.pdf.
258 In re Everfresh, 238 B.R. 558 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. 1999).
259 Practice Guide, supra note 252, at 28 n. 17.
260 See INTERNATIONAL INSOLVENCY INSTITUTE, Cross-Border Insolvency Orders and Protocols
(Alphabetical), http://www.iiiglobal.org/component/jdownloads/viewcategory/573.html.
261 Westbrook, supra note 5, at 2321.
262 In re Maxwell Comm’n Corp., 170 B.R. 800, 802 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. 1994), aff’d, 186 B.R. 807
(S.D.N.Y. 1995).
263 Evan D. Flaschen & Ronald J. Silverman, Cross-Border Insolvency Cooperation Protocols, 33 TEX.
INT’L L.J. 587, 592 (1998).
264 In re Maxwell, 170 B.R. at 802.
265 Jay Lawrence Westbrook, The Lessons of Maxwell Communication, 64 FORDHAM L. REV. 2531, 2535
(1996).
266 Id.
267 See Flaschen & Silverman, supra note 263, at 592 (quoting Maxwell Comm’n Corp, 93 F.3d 1036,
1042 (2d Cir. 1996)).
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The contents of protocols depends on the needs of the parties. Protocols’
flexibility caters to those needs. Protocols should establish what information
the parties must share and how they will do so.268 Protocols can also include
mechanisms to preserve asset value, policies on how to administer claims,
procedures to handle intercompany claims, and meetings among the
signatories.269 Communication between the parties and the courts is one of the
most palpable problems. E.U. surveys showed that although cooperation and
communication is encouraged by the EIR, it generally is insufficient and
poorly coordinated.270 Protocols can ensure that the parties pre-determine
exactly how, when, and with whom such communications must happen.271 The
communications provisions should stipulate the time, place, and manner of
communication; what kind of notice is necessary for communication; which
parties have a right to participate and are entitled to notice; confidentiality;
what goes into the records; and the effects of any given communication.272
Additionally, protocols can, as did the Maxwell protocols, specify how to
coordinate hearings and ensure that different courts are not resolving the same
issues.273 Parties privately agreeing to protocols not only helps courts minimize
disputes and maximize asset value, but also increases court efficiency and the
need for a judge’s involvement.
C. Insolvency Administrator Guidelines
The administrator of insolvency will vary from country to country.274 Most
European countries have a liquidator in charge of overseeing the process.275 In
Canada, a monitor will be appointed.276 This would be akin to the appointment
of a U.S. Trustee or a receiver. Regardless of the representative’s title and
responsibilities, she will play a pivotal role in organizing the liquidation or
reorganization proceedings.277 The representative must have a clear and
distinct authority to undertake the role as coordinator for ensuring

268
269
270
271
272
273
274
275
276
277

See id. at 599–600.
Id.
Insolvency Report, supra note 101, at 14–16.
Legislative Guide, supra note 65, at 46–50.
Id.
Id.
See generally INSOL INT’L, supra note 102 (summarizing insolvency proceeding by country).
Mevorach, supra note 23, at 525.
See Companies’ Creditors Arrangement Act, R.S.C. 1985, c. C-36 (Can.).
Legislative Guide, supra note 65, at 54.
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cooperation.278 Effective cooperation includes cooperation with the court, other
representatives, other courts, and coordination amongst creditors.279
For a corporate group, the ideal would be the appointment of a single, or
lead, representative.280 While other representatives may have dealings with
creditors in their respective nations, the lead representative will have the
ultimate power to ensure that all actions are in the best interest of the estate as
a whole, but still ensure that no one creditor’s in rem rights are sacrificed.281 A
focus on the corporate group worldwide, rather than multiple administrators
fighting for their insular interests, will provide more coherent and efficient
management of the insolvency.282
One step for a lead representative then is to understand the local laws, and
be able to foresee what kind of synthetic proceedings may be necessary or
possible, and how to ensure creditors’ in rem rights are left intact. A court
recognizing the main proceedings may turn over assets to a foreign
representative.283 The representative is responsible for the administration of the
proceedings, the distribution of assets, and administering the assets that are
part of the estate, unless subject to other local laws.284
Another priority for protocols is to establish the protocols by which all the
representatives will communicate with one and other. EIR Article 31 already
mandates that liquidators in the E.U. communicate with each other, but there
are no stipulations as to how they must do so. Detail on communications will
ensure orderly proceedings; additionally, Article 31 does not bind U.S.
representatives.285 Administrators should get notice of any secondary
proceedings that are opened. Notice will prevent the administrator from
missing the opportunity to get a stay for secondary proceedings that would
disrupt efficient proceedings. The English administrators in Nortel requested
that the English courts send letters to all other E.U. member courts to give the
278

Id.
Id.
280 Legislative Guide, supra note 65, at 56.
281 See supra Part I.
282 See Jay Lawrence Westbrook, Multinational Finance: The Last Hurrah of Territorialism, 41 TEX.
INT’L L.J. 321, 326 (2006).
283 EIR, supra note 34, at art. 21(2)–22.
284 Mevorach, supra note 23, at 525.
285 EIR, supra note 34, at art. 31 (“[T]he liquidator in the main proceedings and the liquidators in the
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in lodging and verifying claims and all measures aimed at terminating the proceedings.”).
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English administrators notice of any secondary proceedings and an opportunity
to be heard on the matter.286 The Nortel administrators were granted such
authorization because the administrators argued before the court that it was
necessary for the maximization of the integrated proceedings.287
Recently, some commentators have also suggested mandatory arbitration
for parties, to avoid the prolonged and costly litigation that may arise from
substantive disputes detracting from efficient liquidation.288 While mandatory
arbitration may go too far, encouraging private and early arbitration would be
consistent with the spirit of cooperation outside of court.
CONCLUSION
Under current insolvency law, the most efficient insolvency procedure
requires voluntary cooperation of all the parties involved. The Model Law,
when employed to achieve a single proceedings, has proven to be an effective
tool for efficient universalist procedures.289 Single proceedings are the most
cost-effective means of insolvency, but because of the complexity and
diversity of corporate groups’ structures, it is difficult to ordain a universal
approach to deal with every corporate group insolvency. This Article has
highlighted some of the key problems and issues that arise for corporate group
insolvencies and how they can be dealt with efficiently. Employing tools such
as the CoCo Guidelines and protocols can help establish predictability and a
common goal amongst the debtor, creditors, and courts. Predictability and
accord among all parties will help achieve a better insolvency outcome for the
debtor, the creditors, and the overall economy.

286 Eberhard Braun et al., Cross-border Insolvency Protocol Agreements between Insolvency Practitioners
and their Effect on the Rights of Creditors (Mar. 8, 2011), http://www.iiiglobal.org/component/jdownloads/
finish/362/4271.html.
287 Id.
288 E.g., Gropper, supra note 227, at 214–15; Jay Lawrence Westbrook, International Arbitration and
Multinational Insolvency, 29 PENN ST. INT’L L. Rev. 635, 638 (2011).
289 See generally Mevorach, supra note 23.

